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1. Introduction 
 
A budget process is a system of rules governing the decision-making that leads to a 
budget, from its formulation, through its legislative approval, to its execution. Consider the 
budget process of the United States government. The President formulates a budget proposal as 
part of his annual obligation to report on the State of the Union. Each house of Congress then 
reworks the budget proposal, with a final budget being passed by both houses for presidential 
approval.  
In the last quarter century, the details of the budget process, both in the United States and 
in other countries, have been the object of considerable research (Wildavsky, 1975; Ferejohn and 
Krehbiel, 1987; Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 1999; von Hagen and Harden, 1995, 1996; see also the 
contributions in Poterba and von Hagen, 1999). There is a growing body of empirical research, 
based on international comparative studies, suggesting that the design of budget processes has 
considerable influence on the fiscal performance of governments. This has also been reflected in 
political decisions. In the United States, the Budget Act of 1974, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
Act of 1985, and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1991 all tried to reduce excessive government 
spending and deficits by changes in the budget process. In the European Union, the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union of 1992 mandates reform of budget processes of the member states to 
enhance fiscal discipline.  
One aspect of the budget process that has received considerable attention is the sequence 
of budgeting decisions. Traditionally, Congress voted on budget items line-by-line, or category-
by-category. The sum of all spending approved by Congress emerged as the overall budget—a 
budget process called bottom up. The budget reforms stemming from the Budget Act of 1974 
replaced this tradition with a different sequence. First, Congress was to vote on the total size of 
the budget. Once that was determined, Congress would allocate that total budget among spending 
categories. A budget process of that type is called a top-down process. It was argued at the time, 
that a top-down budget process would lead to a better outcome, in particular, to a smaller budget, 
than would a bottom-up budget process (Committee on the Budget, 1987).  
A similar presumption is shared by many international organizations, which act as if a 
top-down budget process is inherently preferable to a bottom-up process. The Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1987) reported approvingly that several 
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countries adopted top-down budget processes in quest of greater fiscal discipline. Schick (1986) 
analyzes this report, explaining (and supporting) the thinking behind it in great detail. Blöndahl 
(2003) argues that the move to top-down budgeting systems has contributed importantly to 
strengthening fiscal discipline in many OECD countries in the late 1990s. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) expresses a similar preference for top-down processes (IMF, 1996). At the 
same time, many member states of the European Union use a bottom-up budgeting process, with 
negotiation between the finance minister and individual spending ministers (von Hagen and 
Harden, 1995, 1996). 
The presumption in favor of top-down budgeting stands in stark contrast to voting 
equilibrium theory. Suppose rational agents participate as voters in a budget process. In 
particular, if voters are sophisticated in the sense of Farquharson (1969) and Kramer (1972), they 
consider the implications of voting in early stages of the budget process for later stages of the 
process. Furthermore, assume that voters have convex preferences over the individual dimensions 
of the budget, and that the budget process divides the decision-making process into a sequence of 
one-dimensional majority decisions. Based on these assumptions, Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) 
show that the equilibrium of a top-down budget process generally differs from the equilibrium of 
a bottom-up process. Moreover, there is no unambiguous relation between sequence and the size 
of the budget. Depending on the voters’ preferences, a top-down process can lead to larger or 
smaller budgets.1  
This argument depends crucially on the rationality of voters—itself an empirical issue. 
One way to get at this empirical issue is with controlled laboratory experiments. While laboratory 
experiments create artificial environments, they have the advantage over international 
comparisons that the design of an institution and the setting of a decision-making process can be 
controlled much more precisely. 
A number of previous studies have tested voting models in laboratory settings. Holt and 
Eckel (1989) and Davis and Holt (1993) observe sophisticated voting in experiments on two-
stage voting games. Similarly, Gardner and von Hagen (1997) find that equilibrium best 
                                                 
1 The nomenclature surrounding “equilibrium” is complicated. Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) refer to the voting 
equilibrium of a top-down process as a “budget process equilibrium,” and the voting equilibrium of a bottom-up 
process as an “appropriations process equilibrium,” nomenclature inspired in part by the US Congress. Following 
Shepsle (1979) and McKelvey (1979), these are now usually called “structurally induced equilibrium.” At the same 
time, they can be thought of as a Nash equilibrium of the associated voting game, as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). 
To avoid confusion, we will simply use the term “equilibrium” throughout. 
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describes the outcomes in their experimental trials of bottom-up and top-down budget processes. 
McKelvey and Ordeshook (1984) find mixed evidence for equilibrium, depending on the degree 
to which they give subjects the opportunity to communicate and thereby circumvent the 
procedure. They observe that equilibrium has greater explanatory power when communication 
between subjects is strictly limited, and especially when a Condorcet winner exists. Apart from 
Gardner and von Hagen (1997), none of these studies specifically deals with budgeting decisions 
where predictions about the sum of the voting outcomes in all dimensions are of particular 
interest. Furthermore, while all of these previous experiments examine two-dimensional category 
spaces under complete information of all players’ preferences, the study on which we report in 
this paper extends to four dimensions and incomplete information.  
Our study is based on a series of 128 independent trials of voting over budgets in which 
we examine three aspects of voting games: equilibrium, dimensionality, and information. The 
first aspect is a testable implication of the equilibrium theory of Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987), 
where the outcome of a budget process depends in a predictable way on voters’ preferences and 
structure of the process. To test this implication, we vary voters’ preferences and the structure of 
the process (bottom-up or top-down) in a systematic way over these 128 trials.  
The second aspect concerns the effect that dimensionality⎯the number of spending 
categories⎯has on the budget process and its outcome. Our experiment includes treatments with 
two and four dimensions. This leads to a gain in applicability, since budget processes in practice 
only rarely deal with two dimensions, and serves as a robustness check against the criticism that 
the experiments support equilibrium theory only because they consider very simple decision 
making problems. 
The third aspect concerns the effect of incomplete information on the budget process and 
its outcome. Contrasted with complete information (where each voter knows the preferences of 
all voters), our experiment also include treatments with incomplete information. In these 
treatments, a voter knows only his or her own preferences, and not the preferences of any other 
voter. This extension is again made in the interest of realism. Many budgets are processed in 
situations where a voter has limited knowledge of the preferences of other voters.  
Incomplete information requires yet another notion of equilibrium, such as Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium (BNE) for games with uncertainty. This concept, however, presupposes players’ 
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consistent beliefs over the other players’ types, i.e. their preferences.2 Note that our so-called 
incomplete information game does not meet this criterion, because neither the subjects receive 
any information about (the distribution of) the other subjects’ preferences nor do we control 
subjects’ beliefs. Thus, strictly speaking, we do not face a game with uncertainty but with 
ambiguity for which the concept of BNE does not apply. We prefer a setting of ambiguity to a 
setting with uncertainty for two reasons: first, we believe that complex stochastic models would 
overtax subjects’ calculation abilities in the experiment, and second, it is realistic to assume that 
in anonymous budget processes voters often have very little knowledge of other voters’ 
preferences. In this context, the incomplete information treatments serve as a stress test of the 
complete information voting equilibrium theory.      
We find experimental evidence of impacts of incomplete information, in particular that 
agenda tend to be significantly longer under incomplete information. Nevertheless, complete 
information equilibrium theory continues to have substantial predictive power, even though it  
may not strictly speaking apply. 
Our main result is that institutions imbedded in a budget process matter. The data from all 
treatments correspond closely to the theory of structurally induced equilibrium, and institutions 
drive those equilibria. The subjects display a high degree of sophistication over all treatments. 
Both extra dimensionality and incomplete information increase the complexity of the decision 
problem faced by the subjects, and increase the number of periods needed to reach a final 
decision. In contrast to popular notions about budgeting, there is no unambiguous relationship 
between the sequence of budgeting decisions and the size of the budget. Whether or not top-
down budgeting leads to smaller budgets than bottom-up budgeting depends on the preferences 
of the actors involved in the budget process. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out the general model. Section 3 
describes the various model specifications and the design of the experiment, as carried out at the 
economics behavior laboratory of the University of Karlsruhe. Our aggregate results are 
presented in Section 4; individual results, in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with the policy 
implications of this set of experiments. 
 
                                                 
2 Ordeshook and Palfrey (1988) show the impacts incomplete information can have on equilibrium theoretically. In 
their incomplete information voting game, a voter strategically decides on his vote by maximizing his payoff, 
conditional on his consistent beliefs over the distribution of other voters’ preferences. 
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2. A model of budgeting 
 
We present a model of budgeting which starts with and extends the two-dimensional 
model of Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987). Such a model involves dispersed preferences and an odd 
number of voters, at least 3.  
 
2.1 The general model 
 
There are n voters, indexed by i, i=1, ..., n. Using majority rule, the voters decide on the 
size and allocation of a budget. There are m spending categories in the overall budget. Each 
budget category corresponds to a dimension of R+m, the non-negative orthant of the m-
dimensional Euclidean space. Let the vector x = (x1, ..., xm) ∈ R+m denote a possible budget, 
where xj represents spending in the budget category j. The total spending implied by the budget 
vector x is  
 
B =  x j
j=1
m∑ .  
 
Each voter i has preferences over budgets x represented by his or her utility function ui(x). 
We assume that each voter i has an ideal budget (or an ideal point) x*(i) ∈ R+m. The closer the 
actual budget is to a player’s ideal budget the higher is the player’s utility, where closeness is 
measured by the Euclidean distance function: 
 
ui ( ) [ ( )]
*x = − −
=
∑K x x ii j j
j
m
2
1
,  
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where Ki is the utility attached to the ideal point.3 In general, each voter i has an ideal point x*(i) 
distinct from that of all other voters.  
 Several interpretations of players and their ideal points are possible. For instance, the 
players may be spending ministers in a coalition government. In this case, an ideal point 
represents the budget size and composition a spending minister would most like to see enacted. 
As another instance, suppose the player is a member of a legislature. Then the ideal point may 
represent a legislator’s campaign promise to get this budget or something close to it enacted. 
 In a budget process, voting translates preferences into outcomes. Votes are based on 
majority rule. Suppose the vote is over two budget proposals, x1 and x2. If the number of those 
voting for x1 is greater than the number of those voting for x2, x1 defeats x2. It is well known that 
a voting game of this type does not have an equilibrium unless the players’ preferences are such 
that a Condorcet equilibrium exists (Riker, 1962). However, an equilibrium can be induced by 
imposing more structure on the budget process. In our experiments, we study two types of budget 
processes, bottom-up and top-down. 
            In a bottom-up budget process the sequence of votes is taken on a spending category at a 
time. If there are two dimensions the vote is taken first on one spending category and then on the 
other. We define xbu as the vector consisting of the respective median voter’s ideal value in each 
spending category. The vector xbu is the equilibrium induced by a bottom-up budget process. 
To see how this works, consider the five voters whose ideal points, x* = (x1*,x2*), are 
portrayed in Figure 1: (6, 13), (7,9), (8,16), (11,12), and (11,14). These ideal points are used in 
Design I of our experiments. A vote is taken first on category x1. The median voter on this 
category is the third voter, with a desired spending level of 8. This median value has a 3-to-2 
majority against any other value of spending on x1, and it is thus the bottom-up equilibrium in the 
horizontal dimension. Next, a vote is taken on category x2. The median voter on this category is 
the first voter, with a desired spending level of 13. This median value has a 3-to-2 majority 
against any other value of spending on x2, and it is thus the bottom-up equilibrium in the vertical 
dimension. Putting the results from both dimensions together, we get the bottom-up equilibrium 
xbu = (8,13), shown in Figure 1 at the intersection of the vertical and horizontal median lines a 
and b, and the total budget in equilibrium is Bbu = 21. Notice that we would have gotten the same 
                                                 
3 In the two dimensional case the Euclidean utility function leads to circular indifference curves. More 
general preferences are studied experimentally in Lao-Araya (1998), whose results suggest that equilibrium theory is 
robust with regard to elliptical indifference curves. 
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bottom-up equilibrium if the vote had been taken over the x2-category first, followed by the x1-
category. 
In a top-down budget process, the sequence of votes starts with a vote on the total budget, 
B. Then votes are taken on the spending in all but one of the spending categories. The amount of 
spending on the last dimension is determined residually. The vector xtd is the equilibrium induced 
by a top-down budget process. 
To see how this works with two dimensions, again consider the five voters whose ideal 
points are portrayed in Figure 1. A vote is taken first on total spending, B = x1 + x2. The median 
voter on this category is the fourth voter, whose desired total spending level is B*(4) = x1*(4) + 
x2*(4) = 23. The other voters want to spend 16, 19, 24 and 25, respectively. The median value of 
23 has a 3-to-2 majority against any other value of total spending, and it is thus the top-down 
equilibrium in the total spending dimension. Next, a vote is taken on spending in category x1, 
given that total spending is Btd = 23. Consider, thus, the x1  x2 dimension, i.e., the difference of 
the ideal point components. The median voter on this category is the fifth voter with a difference 
of -3, the differences of the other players being -7, -2, -8, and -1, respectively. The median 
voter’s most preferred level of spending on x1, given that  x1 + x2 = 23, is x1 = 10. This median 
value has a 3-to-2 majority against any other value of spending on x1, and it is thus the bottom-up 
equilibrium in the spending on the x1-dimension. Putting the results from both dimensions 
together, we get the top-down equilibrium xtd = (10,13), shown in Figure 1 at the intersection of 
the -45-degree and the 45-degree median lines c and d, respectively. While the -45-degree line 
represents the x1 + x2 dimension, i.e., the 45-degree line represents its orthogonal x1  x2 
dimension. 
In general, bottom-up and top-down equilibria differ: this is the main result of Ferejohn 
and Krehbiel (1987). Comparing the two equilibria in Figure 1, we see that the top-down 
equilibrium implies a total spending of 23 that is larger than the total spending of 21 in the 
bottom-up equilibrium. 
To see the potential for reversal in total spending levels, consider Design II in Figure 2, 
which differs from Figure 1 in exactly one feature, the location of the fourth voter’s ideal point, 
which is now (9,9) rather than (11,12). This move does not change the bottom-up equilibrium, 
which is still at  
 8
(8,13) implying a total spending of Bbu = 21. However, it changes the top-down equilibrium, 
since the median total spending level is now B*(1) = x1*(1) + x2*(1) = 8 + 11 = 19. In this case, 
the top-down equilibrium spends less than the bottom-up equilibrium. Note that both xtd and xbu 
belong to the convex hull of the set of ideal points, and therefore, are Pareto optimal.  
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(a,b,c,d are vertical, horizontal, -45°, 45° median lines through the ideal points) 
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3. Experimental Design 
 
In all of our experimental treatments the number of voters, n, equals five. The number of 
spending categories, m, equals either two or four. To specify the voters' utility functions, we have 
two designs⎯one design is such that the equilibrium theory of a top-down budget process leads 
to a larger budget than the equilibrium theory of a bottom-up budget process, and vice versa in 
the other design. 
We discuss first the simpler case m = 2. To specify the voters' utility functions, we have 
two designs, Design I and Design II. They are presented in Table 1. Notice that the two designs 
differ by the fourth voter’s ideal point only. Voters 1, 2, 3, and 5 have the same ideal points in 
both designs. The general intention behind these two designs is to make the difference between 
the equilibrium induced by a bottom-up process, xtd, and the equilibrium induced by a top-down 
process, xbu, large and in different directions. As can be seen in Table 2, in Design I, the total 
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budget corresponding to xbu is smaller than the total budget corresponding to xtd, while the 
opposite is true in Design II. Design I is also shown in Figure 1; Design 2 in Figure 2. 
We consider now the case m = 4. The basic principle in getting from two dimensions to 
four dimensions is projection: (x1,x2) maps into (x1,x2,x1,x2). The ideal points of each player are 
presented in Table 1. The medians of the ideal points in each dimension are preserved under 
projection.  
For Design III, which is the projection of Design I, the medians in dimensions 1 and 3 are 
8; in dimensions 2 and 4, 13. Putting the components from the four dimensions together, the 
bottom-up equilibrium xbu is given by the vector (8,13,8,13). The total spending under this 
budget is 42.  
The solution xtd induced by the top-down process is the vector (10,13,10,13); this again 
follows by projection. The total spending under this budget is 46. Notice that xtd is different from 
xbu, and in particular that xtd spends more than xbu, 46 versus 42. 
 For Design IV, which is the projection of Design II, the medians in dimensions 1 and 3 of 
the ideal points are 8; in dimensions 2 and 4, 13. Putting the components from the four 
dimensions together, we get (8,13,8,13) as the bottom-up vector xbu. Total spending under this 
budget is 42. 
The solution xtd induced by the top-down process is the (8,11,8,11). The total spending 
under this budget is 38. Notice that xtd also differs from xbu. In contrast to Design III, top-down 
voting leads to a smaller budget, 38, than the budget of size 42 that bottom-up voting adopts. 
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Table 1: 
Individual ideal points and utility function, x*(i) and ui(x) 
 
 Two-dimensional Four-dimensional 
 Design I Design II Design III Design IV 
Voter i  x1*(i)  x2*(i) x1*(i) x2*(i) x1*(i) X2*(i
) 
x3*(i) x4*(i) x1*(i) x2*(i) x3*(i) x4*(i)
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
11 
11 
13 
9 
16 
12 
14 
6 
7 
8 
9 
11 
13 
9 
16 
9 
14 
6 
7 
8 
11 
11 
13 
9 
16 
12 
14 
6 
7 
8 
11 
11 
13 
9 
16 
12 
14 
6 
7 
8 
9 
11 
13 
9 
16 
9 
14 
6 
7 
8 
9 
11 
13 
9 
16 
9 
14 
Utility 
function 
of voter i 
ui(x) 
 
15 2
1
2
− −
=
∑ [ ( )]*x x ij j
j
 
 
 
30 2
1
4
− −
=
∑ [ ( )]*x x ij j
j
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: 
Voting equilibria 
 
 Two-dimensional Four-dimensional 
 Design I Design II Design III Design IV 
Process x1 x2 x1 x2 x1 x2 x3 x4 x1 x2 x3 X4 
Bottom-up 8 13 8 13 8 13 8 13 8 13 8 13 
Σ 21 21 42 42 
Top-down 10 13 8 11 10 13 10 13 8 11 8 11 
Σ 23 19 46 38 
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The instructions for the experiment are based on those of the classic voting experiment 
conducted by Fiorina and Plott (1978). Copies of the instructions (in English, translated from the 
German) are available from the authors upon request.  
In the experiment, subjects are told that each of them is member of a group of 5 subjects. 
In Designs I and II, the group's task is to decide on how many integer-valued tokens to spend on 
two activities, called A and B. In the instructions for a bottom-up budget process, subjects are 
told that they first have to decide on the number of tokens to be spent on activity A. Their 
decision on this number is final. They then have to decide on the number of tokens to be spent on 
activity B, at which point they have completed their task. In the instructions for a top-down 
budget process, subjects are told that they first have to decide on the number of tokens to be spent 
on activities A and B together. Their decision on this number is final. They then have to decide 
on the number of tokens to be spent on activity A, at which point they have completed their task. 
In Designs III and IV, the group's task is to decide on how many tokens to spend on four 
activities, called A, B, C, and D. In the instructions for a bottom-up budget process, subjects are 
told that they first have to decide on the number of tokens to be spent for activity A. Their 
decision on this number is final. They then repeat this process for activities B, C, and D in that 
order, at which point they have completed their task. In the instructions for a top-down budget 
process, subjects are told that they first have to decide on the number of tokens to be spent on 
activities A, B, C, and D together. Their decision on this number is final. They then have to 
decide on the number of tokens to be spent on activities, A, B, and C in that order, at which point 
they have completed their task. 
At each step, the decision task is to decide on a number of tokens to be spent on some 
category or combination of categories. The decision process starts with a proposal on the floor 
which equals zero. At any point in time, each subject has the right to propose an amendment. If 
an amendment is proposed, then the group has to vote on it. If the proposed amendment is 
accepted, then it becomes the new proposal on the floor. If the proposed amendment is rejected, it 
has no effect; the proposal on the floor remains unchanged. In that case, each subject is free to 
propose other amendments, but only one amendment, at a time. At any point of time, a subject 
may also propose to end the process. If this proposal is accepted, then the proposal on the floor is 
considered accepted. If the proposal to end deliberations is rejected, then new amendments may 
be proposed or new proposals for ending the process may be made. 
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All votes are based on simple majority rule. This implies that if three or more members of 
the group vote in favor of the proposal, then it wins. Otherwise the proposal is rejected. 
In the beginning of the experiment, each subject is informed about his personal payoff (or 
utility) function. The instructions give each subject the exact formula for the payoff function, 
which is also explained to him in words. In the case of two spending categories (Design I and 
Design II), the subject is given a table which shows his or her payoff for each combination of 
numbers in the two spending categories. In all four designs, each subject can, in the final 
dimension of voting, call up on his or her computer screen to see individual payoff for the 
proposal on the table and the proposed amendment.  
Besides Designs I through IV, which differ with respect to the number of spending 
categories and the ideal points, we distinguish between two informational treatments. In the 
complete information treatment each subject knows not only his own ideal point, but also the 
ideal points of the four other players in his group. In the incomplete information treatment, each 
player is informed only about his own ideal point. This contrasts with the incomplete information 
analysis of Ordeshook and Palfrey (1988), where voters do know the distribution of other voters’ 
preferences. 
The computerized experiments were organized at the University of Karlsruhe. Subjects 
were students from various disciplines. Each subject was seated at a computer terminal, which 
was isolated from other subjects' terminals by wooden screens. The subjects received written 
instructions that were also read aloud by a research assistant. Before an experiment started, each 
subject had to answer at his computer terminal a short questionnaire (ten questions) concerning 
the instructions. Only after all subjects had given the right answers to all questions did decision-
making begin. No communication other than through the recognition of proposals and the 
announcement of the outcomes of votes was permitted.  
We organized experimental sessions with 15 or more subjects. Thus, no subject could 
identify with which of the other participants he or she was grouped. Each subject participated in 
exactly one trial.  Due to the interactive nature of decision making, each group of five subjects 
yielded one independent observation. For each of the four designs, each of the two budget 
processes, and each of the two information conditions, we obtained eight independent 
observations. Table 3 gives an overview of the experimental treatment design. In obtaining these 
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128 independent observations in total, we also acquired data on 640 subjects, five per 
experiment. 
Table 3: 
Treatment design: number of groups (subjects) in each treatment 
 
  Two-dimensional Four-dimensional 
Information Process Design I Design II Design III Design IV 
 
Complete  
Bottom-up 
Top-down 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
 
Incomplete  
Bottom-up 
Top-down 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
 
 
 
4. Experimental results: aggregate data 
 
This section considers aggregate data from the experiments; the next section individual 
data. Start with the sizes of the overall budgets we observe in these 128 groups. Tables 4 (for the 
two-dimensional treatment) and 5 (for the four-dimensional treatment) give group averages of  
total budget outcomes in all treatments. First consider the direction of the difference in voting 
outcomes: the Ferejohn and Krehbiel equilibrium prediction is never overturned. In 7 out of 8 
cases, when the equilibrium theory predicts a higher budget, a higher budget is observed. In the 
remaining case (Design I, incomplete information), the result is a tie. Using a binomial test, this 
result is significant at a 5% level, against an uninformed null hypothesis. 
Next, consider the size of the difference in voting outcomes. Here we conduct a series of 
Mann-Whitney U-tests, against a null hypothesis of no difference in treatment. Take first the 
complete information treatment. In Design I, the observed outcomes are different at a 10% 
significance level. In Designs II, III, and IV, the observed outcomes are different at a 5% 
significance level. Now take the incomplete information treatment. In Design II, the observed 
outcomes are different at a 10% significance level. In Designs III and IV, the observed outcomes 
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are different at a 5% significance level. The one case of no difference is again Design I, where a 
single large outlier in one trial of the bottom-up process is observed.  
 
 
 
Table 4: 
Average budgets (standard deviation) in the two-dimensional treatments compared to equilibrium 
 
 Design I Design II 
Information Bottom-up Top-down Bottom-up Top-down 
Complete 
 
Incomplete 
21.4 
(1.0) 
22.6 
(2.0) 
22.5 
(1.3) 
22.6 
(1.8) 
21.4 
(1.0) 
21.5 
(1.9) 
19.0 
(1.5) 
20.1 
(2.3) 
Equilibrium 21 23 21 19 
 
 
 
Table 5: 
Average budgets (standard deviation) in the four-dimensional treatments compared to 
equilibrium 
 
 Design III Design IV 
Information Bottom-up Top-down Bottom-up Top-down 
Complete 
 
Incomplete 
42.1 
(2.2) 
43.4 
(3.7) 
46.4 
(1.9) 
46.6 
(2.1) 
43.0 
(2.1) 
43.8 
(1.6) 
38.0 
(1.8) 
38.6 
(1.6) 
Equilibrium 42 46 42 38 
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We summarize these results as follows. 
 
Result 1: Sequence matters. The outcomes observed under bottom-up and top-down 
budget processes significantly differ from each other in most cases, and they differ in the way 
predicted by Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987). 
 
We next argue that equilibrium is a good predictor. To see this, first pool the data from 
Designs I and II. Next compute the Euclidean distance from an observation to the equilibrium, 
then average over all observations. The resulting average distance is 1.5. A similar picture 
emerges for the four-dimensional treatment, where the average Euclidean distance of an 
observation from the predicted value is 2.6. Pooling over all 128 observations, the average 
Euclidean distance of the observed budgets from structurally induced equilibrium is 2.1. We 
summarize this finding as follows: 
 
Result 2: Equilibrium is a good predictor of budget outcome: the average distance of 
observed outcomes from predicted equilibrium is relatively small. 
 
Note that McKelvey and Ordeshook (1984), who examined committee procedures similar 
to our procedure but allowed verbal discussion of the proposals, found that results were closer to 
the equilibrium the more they constrained the degree to which discussion was allowed. A 
consequence of this is that we provide equilibrium theory its best shot, since we allow no 
discussion whatsoever. 
            Let us call an outcome close to the equilibrium if it does not deviate from it by more than 
one unit in any spending category. Table 6 reports the percentages of observations close to   
equilibrium prediction for all information-dimensionality treatments. Over all treatments, 53.8 
percent of the outcomes are close. With complete information, a higher percentage of outcomes is 
close to the equilibrium than under incomplete information. This is true for each dimensional 
treatment separately, as well as on average. Performing a Mann-Whitney U-test, these differences 
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are significant at a 5% level against an uninformed null hypothesis. Second, with lower 
dimensionality, a higher percentage of outcomes is close to equilibrium than with higher 
dimensionality. This is true for each information treatment, as well as on average. Again, these 
differeces are significant at a 5% significance level (Mann-Whitney U-test).   
 
Table 6: 
Percentage of budgets close to the equilibrium budget 
 
Information Two-dimensional Four-dimensional Average 
Complete  78.1 46.9 62.5 
Incomplete  56.3 34.4 45.3 
Average 67.2 40.6 53.8 
 
 
Result 3: Equilibrium is a good predictor of budget outcome: more than half of all 
observed budgets are close to the predicted equilibrium. 
 
We can use the data in Table 6 to compute Selten's (1991) measure of predictive success.  
Define the hit rate as the frequency of outcomes close to the structurally induced equilibrium: the 
hit rate is given in Table 6. Define the area rate as the number of points near equilibrium, 
divided by the number of points logically encompassed by the experiment. The latter set is the 
smallest cube containing the origin—the default if voting leads to an impasse—and the maximum 
ideal point value in any dimension—the highest number we posit any subject to think of 
logically.  Selten’s measure is the difference between the hit rate and the area rate.   
The area rate is larger in two dimensions than in four dimensions. In two dimensions, the 
number of points near equilibrium is 9 (the smallest square with equilibrium at its center). The 
number of points logically encompassed by the experiment is 304, the number of points in the 
cube with vertices at the origin and (11, 16). The resulting area rate is 9/304, or 3%. Repeating 
this calculation for four dimensions, the number of points near equilibrium is 81, while the 
number of points encompassed by the experiment is 41616, the number of points in the 
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hypercube with vertices at the origin and (11, 16, 11, 16). The resulting area rate is 81/41616, or 
0.2%.  
Table 7 converts the hit rates of Table 6 into Selten’s measure of predictive success. The 
highest predictive success is in two dimensions with complete information, over 75%. Predictive 
success decreases with dimensionality, and with loss of information. The lowest predictive 
success is in four dimensions with incomplete information, barely 34%. To put these predictive 
successes into context, the predictive success of Nash equilibrium in the experiment of Keser and 
Gardner (1999) is less than 5%.  
 
Table 7. Predictive Success of Equilibrium 
 
Information Two-dimensional Four-dimensional Average 
Complete  75.1 46.7 60.9 
Incomplete  64.2 34.2 49.2 
Average 69.6 40.4 55.0 
 
 
Result 4: The predictive success of equilibrium theory is over 75% with complete 
information and two-dimensions. It falls markedly with incomplete information and higher 
dimensions.  
 
This result makes intuitive sense. Higher dimensional problems are harder, and subjects 
do not perform as well at solving them. The same is true for problems where less information is 
available. 
Our final aggregate result concerns how long it takes subjects on average to reach a 
decision, as measured in moves (1 move = 1 proposal followed by 1 vote). Notice first that in all 
128 trials, a decision was reached in every case in fewer than 66 moves. Table 8 shows the 
average number of moves needed to reach a budget decision in all four information-
dimensionality treatments. One sees the same pattern in number of moves as one sees in 
predictive success. The fewest moves are needed in two dimensions with complete information—
the configuration where predictive success is highest. The most moves are needed in four 
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dimensions with incomplete information—the configuration where predictive success is lowest. 
Using a Mann-Whitney U-test, the difference between average number of moves in 2-dimensions 
between complete and incomplete information is not significant, while the other three differences 
in Table 8 are significant at the 5% level (four dimensions: difference between complete and 
incomplete information; complete information: difference between two and four dimensions; 
incomplete information: difference between two and four dimensions).  
 
Table 8: 
Average (minimum-maximum) number of moves to reach the budget decision 
 
Information Two-dimensional Four-dimensional 
Complete  
Incomplete  
11.0 (4-23) 
14.5 (4-29) 
22.6 (10-48) 
28.8 (10-65) 
                    
 
Result 5: Every trial reaches a decision in a finite number of moves. The number of 
moves needed to reach a budget decision rises with dimensionality and with incomplete 
information.   
 
This result supports the intuition behind Result 4. In addition, this result is in keeping 
with the qualitative prediction of Ordeshook and Palfrey (1988), where the agenda is longer 
under incomplete information than under complete information. 
 
 
5. Experimental Results: Individual Subject Data 
 
We have seen that equilibrium has considerable predictive success, especially when the 
budget decision facing subjects is small and when subjects are well-informed. Moreover, subjects 
never reach a budget impasse. Since all proposals are endogenous, predictive success and 
avoidance of impasse depend entirely on the quality of proposals and subsequent votes. If 
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proposals are unattractive, and get voted down repeatedly, the budget process will founder. We 
now turn to the quality of proposals. 
One simple criterion is whether subjects propose their ideal points or not. An ideal point 
is surely a better proposal than, say “0,” and it will represent a Pareto optimum at the very least. 
Subjects propose their ideal points surprisingly often. Interpret “propose ideal point” as 
shorthand for “a proposal which, if adopted, would lead to the ideal point value for the subject, 
when projected onto the dimension determined by that proposal.” Table 9 gives the data, drawn 
from over 10,000 proposals over the course of the 128 trials, excluding proposals to end the 
process.  
 
Table 9: 
Percentage of proposals of a subject’s ideal point 
 
Information Two-dimensional Four-dimensional 
Complete  
Incomplete  
42.5 
55.9 
40.8 
                    47.8 
             
        
We see that ideal points get proposed a lot, over 40% in every treatment. Moreover, in a 
given dimension, ideal points get proposed more often when information is incomplete. Indeed, 
employing a χ2 test against an uninformed null, the difference is significant at 5%. A possible 
explanation for the high frequency of ideal point values is their safety⎯a subject can’t do better 
than an ideal point value, at least in a local sense. In the case of incomplete information, 
proposing one’s ideal point also has potential signaling value, as it reveals the proposer’s most 
desired outcome to the other actors. 
 
Result 6: Subjects often propose ideal points, and propose them significantly more often 
when information is incomplete.  
 
 21
Another related measure of the quality of proposals is whether the proposal, if adopted, 
would move towards the equilibrium value on that dimension (“equilibrium seeking”). Table 10 
gives the relevant percentages.   
Table10: 
Percentage of equilibrium seeking proposals 
 
Information Two-dimensional Four-dimensional 
Complete  
Incomplete  
57.3 
30.8 
49.9 
                    35.3 
         
Again, these are impressive percentages. In both dimensions, we observe a higher 
frequency of equilibrium seeking proposals in the case of complete information. Using a χ2 test 
against an uninformed null, the difference is significant at 1% in two dimensions, and at 5% in 
four dimensions. 
 
      Result 7: When not proposing their ideal points, subjects strongly prefer equilibrium seeking 
proposals.  
 
Combining the data of Tables 9 and 10, we conclude that the vast majority of proposals 
either preserve utility by proposing their ideal points or seek equilibrium even when information 
is incomplete.   
With proposals of such high quality, the subjects have created for themselves quite good 
material to vote on. Given good proposals to vote on, the final question is how subjects vote, 
facing such proposals. Here the evidence is again impressive: the vast majority of subjects only 
vote for proposals that favor them. Table 11 reports the percentages of votes for the more 
favorable of two proposals, either the one on the table or the one against it. In the event of 
indifference, we count the vote as for a favorable alternative. 
 
Table11: 
Percentage of votes for favorable proposals 
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Information Two-dimensional Four-dimensional 
Complete  
Incomplete  
86.4 
92.4 
72.1 
                    75.4 
         
 
Subjects vote for favorable proposals between 72% and 92% of the time. We observe 
some slippage in the percentage of votes for favorable proposals in the case of four dimensions, 
compared to two. Using a χ2 test against an uninformed null, the difference is significant at 5%. 
The added complexity appears to make it harder for subjects to vote their self-interest, although 
they still manage to do so much more often than not.  
 
Result 8: Subjects tend strongly to vote for proposals that favor them. 
 
The overall picture that emerges from individual subject behavior is reassuring. Subjects 
make high quality proposals, and then vote for proposals that are favorable to their individual 
interests. These twin features of subject behavior drive the predictive success of equilibrium that 
we observe at the aggregate level. 
 
 
6. Implications for policy makers 
 
This paper has studied budget processes⎯the system of rules governing decision-making 
leading to a budget⎯experimentally. We conducted a series of 128 experiment trials to study 
budgeting processes using subjects in a behavior laboratory. At the aggregate level, we find 
strong support for the Ferejohn and Krehbiel prediction, both qualitatively and quantitatively. We 
observe no instance of budget impasse, and an overall predictive success of almost 50%. At the 
individual subject level, subjects tend to make high quality proposals and vote for proposals that 
favor them. These twin features at the individual level drive the aggregate results towards the 
predicted equilibrium.   
These results have three important policy implications. First and foremost, institutions 
matter. The kind of budget one gets from a budget process is driven by the voting rule, the 
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sequence of decisions, and the distribution of ideal points in a predictable fashion. There is no 
general tendency for top-down budget process to deliver smaller budgets. Although majority 
voting avoided impasse in all cases, we conjecture that a different rule, such as unanimity voting, 
would indeed to rather more frequent impasses, such as that involving the EU budget at the EU 
summit in June 2005.   
Second, since sequence matters, policy makers should not presume that a top-down 
budget process always leads to less spending. Which sequence of decisions leads to smaller total 
budget depends critically on the preferences of the participants involved in the budget process. 
Efforts to design budget processes to achieve greater fiscal discipline should focus on other 
critical aspects, such as the assignment of decision making competences to the participants in the 
budget process (Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1999).  
Third, complexity is costly. If we measure decision-making costs in terms of the number 
of rounds required to reach closure, then costs go up with more spending categories and with less 
complete information. To the extent that decision-making costs are important, agenda setters in a 
budget process, such as finance ministers, are well-advised to keep the overall decision low-
dimensional, even if this means relying on local autonomy for more detailed budget allocations. 
Incomplete information also increases decision-making costs. It does this in several ways: 
reducing the quality of proposals, reducing the accuracy of votes, and lengthening the number of 
rounds. This increases the real-world applicability of our results, since complete information, 
even in a cabinet or legislature of long standing, is rare.  
At least one caveat is called for. Our communication condition was quite strict, compared 
to real world committees and cabinets. As shown by McKelvey and Ordeshook (1984), 
equilibrium fares less well when communication is open. This is a worthy subject for future 
investigation.  
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